PART ONE OF A SERIES.
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| Na Nož, Jaroslav Věšin, 1913 |
-Take Down the Union Jack, Billy Bragg, 2002
At the deepest historical time-depths there is a very basic notion of identity between the self-identified civilised peoples and the barbarians. While the concept of being Greek (Hellenes) didn't yet exist, the city states at the base of the Balkan peninsula saw a commonality between themselves but not with others to the uncharted North or in the later conquered territories of Alexander's empire. The genesis of this fraternity also lies in transmission of culture as the Greek alphabet (save for some regional variations) allowed folk culture to be stored. The established alphabet may also have smoothed over the dialects as it only represents the sounds distinguished within a dialect and not the phonlogical distinctions between the dialects. That would not be unlike the unifying force that Hanzi had on the disparate Chinese languages by representing words and not the component sounds of the languages (which are as wildly different though related as French and Romanian). Indeed, language is one of the most prominent pillars of ethnic identity along with religion (historically Slavic, Germanic, Celtic, etc paganism for pre-modern Europe) and, of course, land.
As humans spread out across the globe they left populations behind until, for the most part, after many millennia they populated the Earth. We'll ignore any migrations back the way they came and subsequent population exchanges and assume a string of settlements form a trail across the land - cultural forks in the road, if you will. This is a continuum without modern political boundaries. Now imagine ten groups of peoples laid out like perfect timezones - at the Western end a unit numbered 1 and at the Eastern end a unit numbered 10. In between we have a full numberline - 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. To the people at 10, those at 1 are sufficiently different that they will not be thought of as the same ethnic group ('ethnos') and vice versa. Suppose, for convenience, 5 is the site of a major population area with political and cultural power. A state then arises centred on this location and the adjacent areas, say 4 and 6, will be assimilated to the local power. Although 3 and 7 are the next nearest, a border now emerges and they will be assimilated to their own local powers (perhaps 2 and 8). The imposition of political boundaries moulds ethnic identities into future national identities centralised to a nation-state. This is a very crude model of ethnogenesis based on the idea of dialect continua which is necessarily geographical - hence we see the West Germanic languages from West to East: English, Frisian, Dutch, German. This is also a model for the creation of nation-states, though not all states are nation-states as not all nations (ethnic groups) have a state. In my above example the odd one out is Frisian which is mainly spoken in coastal areas of the Dutch state (the Netherlands).
The Frisian language is an intermediate step between English and Dutch, however there are probably dialectical intermediaries between Frisian and the respective languages on either side. It can't be infinitely divisible and therefore a distinction has to be made at some level. For example, (Slavic) Macedonians have long been in a tug of war between neighbouring states regarding their categorisation as either Western Bulgarians or Eastern Serbs. Where does one ethnos end and the other begin? Within the established states a national identity and national culture are formed within their boundaries, drawing upon the continuum and formulating a standard that largely overwrites the gradients of the continuum. This has an effect of increasing the differences between peoples across borders so that while linguistic dialects could be called languages in their own right (which is an unresolved issue in linguistics) they are now deprecated as dialects of the standardised language. This is how Scots, an independent West Germanic language which split off from Old English, became redefined as a dialect of Modern English as spoken in Scotland (and furthermore disparaged as a non-standard 'slang' form of Scottish English). The rise of nineteenth century German nationalism may have resulted from looking across the border to Napoleonic France and seeing 'the other', prompting the Kleinstaaterei to realise their commonality.
The described process of ethnogenesis is an idealised view of history in which things play out 'naturally'. For the post-colonial African and Asian states, the borders that were implemented were either deliberately created to keep the inhabitants divided (as formerly in Sudan, or even in Europe with Romania and Moldova) or reflected the pre-existing colonial spheres of influence which already did so - thus; rather than two states existing in place of Nigeria, we have one that spans a large North-South schism. You might say such a division is something to be overcome lest we get a sequel to the Biafran war. In that case, what makes Nigeria any less artificial a state than Yugoslavia? Ethnic division is something to be overcome universally. That is, there's nothing that makes a long standing state like Spain (since 1479 from the union of Castille and Aragon) any more natural than the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (created in 1918, aka Yugoslavia) - they are all constructs of political power. Alternatively, existing nation-states can be destroyed by forced incorporation into a larger one as happened with the Boer Republics into the Union of South Africa.
The ethnic organisation of the Germanic and Slavic tribes beyond the Roman Empire was supposedly fluid. Believe it or not, there was a time when the Balkans had no ethnicities to war over. A flock of birds is a group heading in the same direction, and an ethnos could be thought of as the same. There were no nationalities because there were no states, so being a member of the group could have simply been a case of residing with and adopting the norms of that group. This is unlike the nineteenth and early twentieth century where the misapplication of Darwinism led to some definitions of ethnic identity as being restricted by race and blood-lines. If at some point part of the group no longer wishes to flock in the same direction then a new group branches off. The personal union between Norway and Sweden was not far removed from that of Scotland and England. The fact that the two came together shows the world map is not static, and the fact they parted amicably in 1905 restates that. Another example is the founding of Czechoslovakia in 1918 only for it to calmly dissolve seventy five years later in 1993. History it littered with former countries, but the above are important because they parted peacefully without waging or threatening war to achieve it. Yugoslavia on the other hand was violently cleaved several times over the span of almost fifteen years.
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| Tito, USSR Post stamp, 1982 |
What then of Scottish nationalism given my opening quote? I support the principles of self-determination, I support independence for all not least my own country. That said, I approach the issue as one of decentralising power from London and drawing representation closer in the same way Latin America rejected distant Spanish colonial administration and declared loyalty to the local state. I really have no interest in defining the campaign for independence by recapitulating the worst of the Darwino-Neitzschean stupidity from the last century - I'm fairly sure my maternal great-grandparents were from the Manchester area, and on my father's side they were from Northern Ireland. I'm not exactly sure what it is to be Scottish, though in the end I would self-identify in that hazy concept. The only way Scottish-ness can really be defined at this point is in the manner the referendum will be conducted - on the basis of residency North of the Tweed. The referendum is then really about which source of power will govern the land - Edinburgh or London. The avoidance of ethnic identity in the lead up to the referendum betrays the problem of the modern nation-state - founding the state on the principle of representing a nation.
Finally, we shall tell them that there is no way of having true brotherhood except within those natural groups, the family, the town, the homeland.
-Philippe Pétain, Revue des deux Mondes, 1940
When people imagine what an alternative history in which the Nazis won the war would look like, their first cry is that we'd be speaking German. Not that the rule of law would be suspended, or our democratic institutions would be dismantled, nor the imposition of a perverted ideology - it's the notion that they'd make us speak another language. And yet when the political class has to define what exactly are the values of Britain (presumably unique distinctions in comparison with other states) they refer to the democratic tradition or to the principle of freedom and adherence to human rights. Which is the same answer you would get from pretty much any first world state. I've heard the exact same sentiments expressed by President Hollande regarding France ("liberté, égalité, fraternité"). Odd then that with these being the self-described definitions of both Britain and France (and numerous others) that all these states are not one. The historical element of racialism, that was a part of nascent nationalism when it arose in the nineteenth century, has been quietly dispensed with given the experiences of the twentieth century and left us without reasoning for these arbitrary boundaries. Why this state and that state have particular geographical limitations then comes down to being a relic of the projection of political power. In the case of the multi-ethnic states like the former Austria-Hungary or modern day China (once known as the "five races under one union") the population gathered under it have no concept of fraternity save the collective fealty to the political force that is sovereign over their land.
Austria-Hungary was doomed once nationalism challenged the idea of organising a state by the ownership of land. Why did one German dynasty bring a state together and another oversee the dissolution of its lands? The Austrian Empire (as it was before being reorganised in 1867 as a dual monarchy) had acquired extensive central European lands variously populated by Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Romanians, Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Slovenians, and Italians as well as Austrian Germans. Once these groups came to identify with their ethnic kin more than allegiance to the German Hapsburg emperor the end of the empire was sealed - it was staved off for five decades by a rotten compromise with the next largest demographic, the Hungarians. Contemporary and to the North was Prussia under the reign of the House of Hohenzollern which ruled over a less exorbitant ethnic mix of Lithuanians, Poles, Russians, Danes and Germans. Germans composed roughly less than a quarter of the Austrian Empire, whereas Prussia was, in the years immediately prior to German unification, largely comprised of annexed ethnically German states. Though both Austria and Prussia sat on the edges of German territory, it was Prussia that came to rule a unified Germany by virtue of demographics. Austrian power lay well outside in mitteleuropa and was unwilling to part with these lands and was therefore excluded from participation in the German Empire (the Kleinedeutschland solution). Come 1918, when the German Empire was deprived of the Eastern territories that would form parts of an independent Poland it hardly dented its size or territorial integrity. Austria, on the other hand, was geographically devastated and left as a rump state desperate to unite with Germany. Only by the Treaty of Saint-Germain forbidding unification and almost a century of exclusion (excepting anschluß) has a sense of Austrian-ness distinct from German identity arisen.
In contrast to the Hapsburg lands, the People's Republic of China successfully continued the state of the Republic of China by presenting a unifying ideological force instead of divisive nationalism (The Soviet Union was less successful in perpetuating the Russian Empire with this approach). While Outer Mongolia did breakaway, the rest of China remained unified and did not become a Han state, a Manchu state, a Uyghur state, and a Tibetan state. That it is the second largest country in the world by land area is simply an accident of history and no more the proper state of affairs than if it had balkanised into a multitude of smaller states that the outside observer might struggle to tell apart. The unifying force in China has been so strong as to almost coalesce the other groups into Han identity, though at the Western extremities Tibet and Xinjiang remain distinct and the scenes of periodic unrest and calls for independence.
I'm not for a second going to suggest that Scotland has been or is being forcibly subsumed to the notion of Britain in the manner that Tibet has to China since 1959. Scottish culture, whether or not tartan is an artificial creation of the nineteenth century, has actually fared well and is easily identifiable despite three hundred and six years of the Acts of Union. Far more the victim is English identity - today it barely exists as more than the domain of the extreme right wing. In 'Take Down the Union Jack' Billy Bragg was searching for a way to reclaim English nationalism from the right and pursue it along the lines that Scottish and Welsh nationalists have. Let us ask what is Britain? If it's a land for the Britons, who are the Britons? 'Britain' is to the nations of the island of the same name as 'Balkanisation' is to the people of the Balkan peninsula - a power-play to deny self-determination where it conflicts with the naked interests of the Great Powers. It's an umbrella term for the Scots, the English, and the Welsh which seeks to recast those identities and create an artificial one in order to legitimise the economic union known as the United Kingdom. The Scottish unionist campaign's utter lack of even meaningful abstract notions of Britishness to appeal to, I think, reveals that the truth of the matter is a desire to retain status and power. You only need look at the way the Labour party has floundered in the Scottish parliament for over six years since the SNP ascendency because all its best known names prefer to attend Westminster and talk of Holyrood as the Noddy parliament (ie, the parliament of Toyland) despite it having the majority of legislative powers North of the border.
The Thirteen Colonies broke away from Britain not because they didn't identify as 'Englishmen' but precisely because they did and sought the freedoms that it guaranteed. For a time they retained that identity though they organised as a republic. Thus two states arose in North America representing Englishmen split according to loyalty to the British crown - the other became Canada which remains a monarchy. Such binary states have existed recently, though the existence of East and West Germany or North and South Vietnam were the result of ideological conflict and manipulation by the superpowers. It's not a problem in itself that two states could represent the same ethnos, rather it is the exclusive claim on representation that leads to conflict. Disagreements among citizens regarding the sovereignty of the land are inevitable and they can't all be fulfilled on the same land. Without cultural attachment to geography, pursued far enough we'd end up with a patchwork world of micro-states and be back full-circle with the Kleinstaaterei of eighteenth century Germany. As it is, we can't dispense with geography to solve the problem of disputed sovereignty because the interactions of a population rest on the universality of a sovereign - that we all live under the same judiciary for example. Facetiously, if half the population held that murder was a crime and the other half were not bound by such a law then consider the ensuing chaos. Inevitably a struggle would ensue to install a common and singular frame of interaction.
Revolution is based on land. Land is the basis of all independence. Land is the basis of freedom, justice, and equality.
-Malcolm X, Message to the Grassroots, 1963
In abandoning the now controversial idea that our states are borne from the culture and norms of the resident ethnos and represent it alone, boundaries defined as the extent of settlement by particular peoples; the nation-states of the world have hollowed out the justifications for their existence along national lines. At the same time a belief in the free movement of people and in a plurality of cultures within the same space has brought about a low-level culture-war occurring beneath the surface of European society. Those issues will form part two of this series.
Written October 2012, and June 3rd and 4th
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